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School of Engineering and Information Sciences
Research Seminars
(Autumn Term 2009-10)

Abstract


Tcpcrypt: The Case for Ubiquitous Transport-Level Encryption

Andrea Bittau
UCL CS (soon to be Stanford CS)

Abstract

Ubiquitous network traffic encryption, if integrated with application-level authentication, could solve a variety of vexing
network problems. It would, among other benefits, thwart phishing, increase the cost and reveal the extent of eavesdropping, and protect against spoofed packets.

We argue that such ubiquitous encryption is best achieved at the transport layer, where it can work through NATs, protect the integrity of vital header fields (such as TCP's RST bit), immediately offer some protection to unmodified legacy applications, and naturally support sessions, the most common granularity of authentication. Neither application- nor network-level encryption enjoys all of these properties.

We present tcpcrypt, a cryptographic TCP extension that is practical to enable by default. Tcpcrypt requires no cryptographic setup. It provides complete interoperability with legacy TCP. It is engineered for performance, with the bulk of the key exchange computation pushed to clients. A server running our tcpcrypt prototype can perform 20 times more key negotiations per second than an SSL-based server.