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P. Duquenoy, H. Thimbleby, S. Torrance

Middlesex University, London, UK.

Abstract

This paper explores the work of Jurgen Habermas in relation to current debates on the role of the Internet in social developments. We believe that Habermas's philosophy can prove fruitful in illuminating key issues in Internet ethics, and show how his theoretical conceptions of Communicative Action and Discourse Ethics map on to current developments in electronic public communication networks. We point to ways in which the resulting conceptual framework may help to progress the resolution of key problems in the ethical environment in which we find ourselves.

Keywords: cyberspace, novelty theory, continuity theory, public sphere, communicative action, discourse ethics, regulation.

1 Introduction

Utilising Habermas's theory of Discourse Ethics can aid us in addressing some of the current problems of the Internet - specifically the area of regulation, and difficulties of ethical consensus in a global environment. Underlying, and compounding, the confusion of ethical debate in this area, is an issue of "new or old" ethics. We begin this paper with an exposition of these two positions (novelty theory and continuity theory) and give reasons why we believe the framework offered by Habermas is helpful in this context.

The aim of this paper is to provide some background to the ideas of Jurgen Habermas and Discourse Ethics, and follow these through by directly relating them to the Internet. Having established the relevance of Habermas's work to this area we move from the theory to practice and, in the context of regulation, assess the benefits of the framework in a practical application.

Our conclusion is that a study of Habermas is relevant to the environment of the Intenet, and the initial insights gained from this work are merely a starting point for a deeper investigation.

2 New or old ethics?

We have mentioned above an underlying issue regarding "new or old" ethics, and the added confusion this brings to discussions of "Internet Ethics". We therefore consider it worthwhile at this early stage, to set out the two positions as we see them, and show that the framework we are suggesting can accommodate both perspectives.

We refer to the debate concerning whether current and foreseen innovations in the development of cyberspace offer intrinsically new kinds of socio-historical structures (novelty theory), or whether they simply provide the latest phase in longstanding, social developments (continuity theory).

For novelty theorists cyberspace appears to offer new social structures which create fresh ethical challenges requiring novel thinking. For example notions such as cyberspace may be seen as bringing changes to our previous conceptions of spatiality and temporality within social organization, or as changing our boundaries of real/unreal or physical/nonphysical. These conceptual changes may be seen as radically affecting the ways our interactions are to be regulated, and the content of those interactions. Continuity theorists, in contrast, see the issue as more that of applying existing frameworks of ethics, law and convention to internet-based activities. However even for continuity theorists there are no straightforward answers to how such frameworks should be applied. In either case, ethical issues regarding regulation apply both to the scope of regulation (what activities should or should not be governed by regulative frameworks?), the methodology of regulation (how is regulation to be organized?) and the justification and selection of regulation (what normative principles should guide us in deeming particular regulatory frameworks as the appropriate ones to adopt?). The denial of regulation per se, for simplicity, we will take as a special case of regulation.

Cyberspace provides, not just a field to which regulatory frameworks are to be applied, but also a forum for negotiation between those frameworks. Habermas's theories of communicative action and of discourse ethics take as central the negotiation and validation of norms within a public, communal discursive field. The result is a rich framework for the justification and selection of normative principles.

Habermas's theory of communicative action is itself based upon his early historical work analysing the 'public sphere', that is various forms of discussion and debate that grew up in early capitalist society during the eighteenth century. If we are to apply Habermas's insights to the Internet, then, it may look as though we are committing ourselves to a continuity perspective, seeing current developments as the most recent phase of a long-standing set of historical processes. However this is not necessarily the case. For, as we shall see, Habermas's conception of discourse ethics allows us to view the Internet and cyberspace as heralding a new era of communicative activity with new forms of social relationship.

For the Internet to be useful there must be some framework for trust, which assimilates features from established practices and carries them through to a changing environment. Turst operates in a shared space, and although some "useful (to some) activities require deceit, this implies misplaced trust on behalf of others.

3 The work of Jürgen Habermas in relation to the Internet

Habermas's early work (1962) was an investigation of the social construction of early capitalism as exemplified by bourgeois 18C social institutions such as private clubs, coffee houses, learned societies, publishing houses and journals. These institutions encapsulated a variety of rights and norms, and raised issues rather like those raised by the Internet as a forum of communication and discussion of today. Obviously there are enormous differences based upon the fact that the 18C bourgeois public sphere was an elite institution whose membership was enjoyed only by the few, whereas much of the interest of the Internet today is centred around its potentiality to support activity of an ever-increasing proportion of world-wide society. Habermas saw these institutions as acting as an interface between the state and society; and it may be that the Internet plays a similar role today.

Habermas maintains a cautious optimism in the possibility of a public communal communicative activity as a means of enabling democracy to flourish in society, particularly the complex technologically dominated and culturally pluralistic society of the late 18C. Although naturally the Internet is not mentioned, it clearly fits into his picture. At the centre of Habermas's mature theory is his key notion of communicative action (1981) whose essential goal is to attempt to reach agreement or mutual understanding rather than achieve a manipulated dominance of belief. At the heart of this practice is each participant’s subsuming their own individual goals to that of achieving a cooperatively shared practice. Habermas developed in turn a special moral theory, Discourse Ethics, which he believed emerged from his theory of communicative action. The guiding principle governing discourse ethics states that in order for any norm to be morally valid everyone relevantly affected must be able to accept the consequences of its being put into practice (1983: 65). Habermas believes that this version of the universalization principle (a type of principle familiar since Kant) is derivable from a consideration of what is presupposed in the notion of an ideal speech situation where all participants are free from "all external constraints" and where only the quality of argument counts.

4 Habermas's Discourse Ethics

Discourse ethics (by definition) is about communication. Jurgen Habermas (1983) argues that the unique features of being human include an ability for rationality and language communication. He uses rationality as the universal underpinning for arriving at legitimate ethical norms. Habermas - by using communication in the form of argumentation - actively involves others in a dynamic way thus bringing a more explicit social element to the ethical domain. He states: "In his capacity as a participant in argumentation, everyone is on his own and yet embedded in a communication context" (1983: 202). On this view moral judgements are ideally arrived at through a joint endeavour to achieve understanding, instead of by individual reflection based on an assumption of mutual understanding (which, according to Habermas, is the position taken by Kant).

The resulting ethical positions are not static and fixed, but are dynamic and grounded in the social world. Their legitimacy comes from this grounding, expressed as a consensus of the participants. The process of (valid) argumentation, by its critical nature, tests the validity of claims (in the same way scientific argument tests validity) and by this process has the capacity to identify and correct mistakes. In other words, a learning process is opened up.

Thus Habermas gives us a procedure by which to arrive at and assess moral norms. Section 7 elaborates the criteria and conditions which Habermas requires for his theory.

5 Discourse Ethics and "Cyberspace": the problems of culture and new concepts

One of the perceived difficulties of achieving an ethical consensus is the cultural diversity of the Internet, and hence a diversity of ethical priorities and values between communities. Although Habermas does not claim that discourse ethics can be used "inter-culturally", the underlying principle of rational argumentation can provide a platform for discussion. The mediating role of discussion, in the form that Habermas describes, allows for exchange of ethical views with the potential for reaching agreement. That is, cultural differences do not necessarily mean a "stalemate" situation.

Habermas argues that our individual ethics are inextricably linked to our life experiences and social norms in a two-way interaction. Our individual moralities construct a society which in turn is reflected back to the community in the form of "institutions". Consequently our ethical views are entwined with our culture, carrying the implication that although communities have the potential to reach a consensus regarding moral action, the scope of consensus is unlikely to be far reaching. However, if we pursue this argument, we could say that the increasing internationalisation of individuals (i.e. a growing exposure of individuals to other cultures and ways of life) is part of our life-world experience. Moreover, following the thesis of two-way interaction, the input of cultural exchange via the Internet may lead to a new social construction; the Internet being the institution which reflects a new morality by the same process of reflection mentioned above. That is, the public belief of "cyberspace" becomes a social reality and is sufficient to be called a community within which valid norms will be generated.

This brings us to perceived difficulties of a rapidly changing environment. If, as Habermas suggests, our moral views are context-sensitive, then a changing environment implies ethical changes over time. A new environment may mean a new morality. According to John Ladd (1977) this is because traditional norms and principles are called into question, and standard moral practice is no longer relevant in the new situation. Hitherto the period of transition has been gradual, and the changes subtle and almost unnoticeable. It could be that the speed of change forced by the Internet has not been matched by our individual (moral) adaptation in this instance, and we see a resulting ethical tension evidenced by debate at all levels. Put simply, there is a "mismatch" between our conventional ethics and cyberspace ethics, as we endeavour to catch up with new concepts.

6 Regulation

The enabling aspect of the internet - for instance the way it fosters freedom of expression, and the scope of its reach - has generated a number of ethical issues. These apply both within nations or cultures, and transculturally and internationally. These ethical concerns relate to issues such as freedom of speech, censorship, access, privacy, harmful content, to name but a few. Addressing these concerns within a purely national context, though difficult, would probably be easier than trying to find internationally binding solutions. Because of the global reach of the internet (including its specific design features, such as re-routing) the "continuity" position advocating traditional methods of regulation to achieve universally acceptable or accepted solutions would be especially problematic (Berleur and Brunnstein, 1996). Nevertheless clearly it would be unwise and to settle for anything less than global resolutions of such concerns. In the face of this what general principles, governing ethical or normative decision-making might be brought to bear on achieving such global understandings?

The development of the Internet so far has been withou formal regulation. There have of course been regulatory mechanisms in the form of protocols, and practices achieved by consensus. However, as use of the Internet grows so too has debate regarding regulation. Governments are involved in this debate, wishing to encourage the continuing development of the system (seen as offering a great many benefits in many spheres of life, including trade) and to protect the user/consumer. So far, governments are treading warily, appreciating the speed of technological change and the difficulties imposed by the technology (not least of which are problems of definition; the Internet pushes the boundaries of current models regarding communication media). There is a trend for a range of regulation; at one end self-regulation, and at the other, formal, governmental legislation. (See for example OECD, 1998.)

Formal legislation, traditionally applicable within physically defined national boundaries, can of course work internationally, but the controls and constraints of physical borders applicable to our geographical environment do not transfer easily to "cyberspace". Using the metaphor of "cyberspace" encourages a spatial and somewhat abstract concept leading to an impression of a "virtual world". This abstract entity compounds the perceived difficulties of enforcing legislation. Within this environment, which is controlled and constrained by users and technical development (respectively), the emphasis is on self-regulation and a response to perceived ethical concerns in the form of trust-building initiatives. (Department of Trade and Industry, 1999.)

Self-regulation by itself does not solve ethical differences. However, the process of self-regulation (driven by the necessity for reaching agreement) involves discussion and negotiation.

7 Discourse Ethics in practice

This section illustrates by example discussions concerning regulation regarding the Internet which have taken place in the last year.

Forums were specifically set up to attempt to reach a consensus on outcomes. The first, a series of workshops leading to a round table, (Rolling Workshop: Ethical Governance of the Internet; and Round Table 4: Governance of the Internet: Ethical Point of View) took place as part of the IFIP conference Human Choice and Computers (HCC5) and was organised by IFIP SIG9.2.2 to meet their objective of providing "spaces for discussion" (as set out in the preface to Berleur and Brunnstein: 1996). The second was a EURIM (European Informatics Market: see http:/www.eurim.org/) working party investigating the role of regulation, in particular self regulation, in connection with the Internet. (N.B. One of the authors of this paper was a participant in both groups in an official capacity as rapporteur.)This paper is not so much concerned with the outcomes of the meetings mentioned above, as with the procedures, and how far they meet the conditions of discourse ethics as described by Habermas. These conditions are i) universalization, ii) the validity of moral norms, and iii) consensus (1983; 65-6,93). In Habermas terms the requirements for all those participating are:

i) freedom,

ii) equality and

iii) uncoerced agreement.

Did the events under discussion meet these conditions?

8 The two groups

8.1 Workshops and round table organised by SIG.9.2.2 (IFIP conference, HCC5, Geneva, August 1998)

The participants in this case were the conference delegates, many of whom were members of IFIP. They were attending in their own right (i.e. not as representatives of organisations) and therefore were free to express their own opinions and make their own choices. The first criterion is met.

The workshops provided background information on network governance (by way of presentations), and delegates were given the opportunity to clarify details of the presentations following each workshop. They were encouraged to pass to the rapporteur any comments they had for discussion at the Round Table session (held at the end of the conference). The format of the Round Table session was a series of presentations by those delegates who had asked to speak and had something particular to say, followed by discussion. All participants had equal opportunity and rights of participation. The second criterion is met.

Following the discussions at the Round Table session some resolutions were sought by the Chairman. Some participants made proposals, which were voted on, and accepted for pursuing in the future. There was a consensus based on standard voting protocols.

8.2 EURIM working party on Network Governance

This group differed from the one described above in that the participants were representatives of organisations that have an interest in regulation and the Internet. Meetings were, on average, once a month, but the timings were essentially driven by forthcoming proposals concerning Internet regulation from the European Commission and from the United Kingdom government. The participants were free within the group setting to participate and argue, but bearing in mind their attendance as representatives of other bodies, the question of freedom of their own individual opinion cannot be assumed. The criteria can be met on the level of expressing the opinion of the organisations represented, but not necessarily at the individual level. Point (i) is not met literally.

There is a hierarchical structure to this group (due to administrative constraints), consisting of a core working party, plenary meetings and consultation meetings. All those present at any of the meetings had equal opportunities and rights of participation. Generally, any member of EURIM expressing a desire to attend any meeting would be welcomed. Therefore, although participation is largely a matter of personal choice, there was not full participation at all meetings. However, all concerned were kept informed of progress, and new moves were not made without consultation with all concerned. In this respect equality was maintained. Point (ii) is met.

The purpose of the group was to investigate the role of self regulation within the context of the Internet and produce a briefing paper summarising the EURIM position and detailing EURIM recommendations. This was produced after extensive discussion and consultation, and agreement given by those participating. A consensus was reached. Point (3) met.

8.3 Summary of the discussions

This short summary shows a similar pattern to discourse ethics. Although it cannot be said that a particular ethical issue was being discussed in these cases, ethical issues regarding the Internet were in general discussed and principles and recommendations put forward as a result of the discussions. As one of the principles of discourse ethics requires "freedom from constraint" it is a moot point whether both groups met the conditions set out by Habermas. Some may say that individuals are under coercion from the organisations that employ them, but we argue that as representatives of an organisation they are not coerced.

Even without the direct element of a particular ethical topic, insights can be drawn from the analysis. Both groups can be classified: the IFIP HCC5 event surely meets the conditions of "communicative action", which is a prerequisite for discourse ethics; and the EURIM series, if it is decided that a level of coercion exists, would be classed by Habermas as "strategic action".

9 Conclusions

This paper shows that to some extent a discourse ethics is already in operation outside, but about the Internet. The discussions surrounding the issue of regulation of the Internet, and the way the discussions are managed, are similar in many ways to the discursive atmosphere of the 18C coffee houses that Habermas refers to. Modern society is also in the process of bringing a regulatory framework to an anarchic situation, at the same time seeking a framework that will maximise the possibilities of innovation and creativity. It is impossible at this stage to derive any clear practices from this, but we hope that future studies will draw out how Habermas’s theoretical scheme can help to illuminate practices in this fundamental area of social activity.

Constraints of space limit us from expressing the many productive ideas Habermas stimulates, and which we will explore in a larger paper.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by EPSRC grant number GR/M14548. Penny Duquenoy is a PhD student funded by EPSRC.

Thanks to IFIP SIG 9.2.2 and EURIM for permission to use the examples given.

References