TITLE: Endogenous Boolean Games SPEAKER: Paolo Turrini (Department of Computing, Imperial College London) ABSTRACT: In boolean games players exercise control over propositional variables and strive to achieve a goal formula whose realization might require the opponents' cooperation. Recently, a theory of "incentive engineering" for such games has been devised, where an external authority steers the outcome of the game towards certain "desirable" properties consistent with players' goals, by imposing a taxation mechanism on the players that makes the outcomes that do not comply with those properties less appealing to them. My contribution stems from a complementary perspective and studies, instead, how boolean games can be transformed from inside, rather than from outside, by endowing players with the possibility of sacrificing a part of their payoff received at a certain outcome in order to convince other players to play a certain strategy. What I call "endogenous boolean games" (EBGs) boils down to enriching the framework of boolean games with the machinery of side payments coming from game theory. I analyze equilibria in EBGs, showing the preconditions needed for desirable outcomes to be achieved without external intervention. Finally, making use of taxation mechanism, I show how to transform an EBG in such a way that desirable outcomes can be realized independently of side payments.